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TAX-INDUCED DISTORTIONS IN THE
VOLUNTARY SECTOR
Charles T. Clotfelter*
IN COMPARISON with most other countries, the United States
government relies heavily on its voluntary, or nonprofit, sector to
undertake important social functions.' Not coincidentally, that
sector enjoys some of the world's most generous tax concessions.
To what extent this tax treatment is the cause, and to what extent
it is the result, of this historic dependence on the nonprofit sector
is unclear and would make an interesting question for research.
What seems certain is that, in the case of the nonprofit sector,
public policy is to a large extent synonymous with tax policy. In
general, this tax policy appears to be designed to stimulate sup-
port for its institutions and subsidize its operation, and there is a
good bit of evidence to suggest that this tax policy is effective to-
ward those aims. But, like any broad social policy carried out in
different ways at different levels of government, this tax policy has
various effects, not all of which were intended or could have been
predicted.
Public debate over nonprofit tax policy reflects both this pol-
icy's significance within the larger scope of American social policy
* Professor of Public Policy Studies and Economics, Duke University; B.A., Duke
University (1969); Ph.D., Harvard University (1974).
I am grateful to Robert Conrad and Pamela Gann for helpful comments on an earlier
draft.
1. For a general discussion of the history of the nonprofit sector in the United States,
see Hall, A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SEC-
TOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 3 (W. Powell ed. 1987). Clearly the federal government
depends on the services provided by nonprofits. Whether the special tax treatment given to
nonprofits induced governmental dependence is not known. Perhaps the opposite is true and
the favorel tax status came about only after government recognized its dependence upon
the services nonprofits supply. The answer to this question would make an interesting ques-
tion for further research.
2. Shuster, Tax Incentives as Arts Policy in Western Europe, in NONPROFIT ENTER-
PRISE IN THE ARTS: STUDIES IN MISSION AND CONSTRAINT 321-24 (P. DiMaggio ed. 1986).
See also C. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 1 (1985)(dis-
tinctively large tax subsidies are provided to the nonprofit sector in the United States).
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and its financial importance to the well-being of the nonprofit sec-
tor. One important state law issue in this ongoing debate is the
property tax exemption enjoyed by nonprofit institutions.' At the
federal level, one of the most hotly-debated domestic issues in re-
cent years is the tax treatment of commercial activity by nonprofit
organizations." An even more intense debate occurred two decades
ago over the tax treatment of charitable foundations. The deduc-
tion for charitable contributions, itself a fixture in the federal in-
come tax almost from its inception, has also been an issue of
debate.'
The possibility that a change in the tax law may alter the
level of charitable funding which flows into the nonprofit sector
overshadows the argument on all of these important issues. The
effect on contributions was argued in Congress prior to the intro-
duction of a standard deduction following World War 116 and con-
cern for the level of charitable contributions is still evident today.
For instance, in the unprecedented debate over income tax reform
in the mid-1980s, few issues attracted as much sustained interest
as the treatment of charitable contributions.
3. Gabler & Shannon, The Exemption of Religious, Educational, and Charitable
Institutions from Property Taxation, in IV RESEARCH PAPERS: SPONSORED BY THE COM-
MISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2535 (Dep't of the Treasury
1977).
4. See Unrelated Business Income Tax, 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1987) (statement of 0. Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Tax Policy, U.S. Dept. of Treasury). See also United States v. American Bar En-
dowment, 477 U.S. 105, 109-16 (1986)(tax-exempt organization must pay tax on the prof-
its earned from insurance it sold to its members); United States v. American College of
Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 847-50 (1986)(tax-exempt organization must pay tax on the
profits earned from commercial advertising it sold in its professional journal); Klott, Non-
profit Groups Face Broader Tax on Some Ventures, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1988, at 1, col.
4 (the Reagan Administration endorses a congressional plan to tax more income-producing
activities of tax-exempt organizations).
5. C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 31-34.
6. To illustrate the debate over the standard of deduction, see 90 CONG. REC. 4029
(1944) (statement of Rep. Curtis):
This bill, when carried into effect, means that the individual who gives a portion
of his hard-earned money in contributions will have the same amount of taxes
. . . as if he had given nothing.
This administration . . . has chosen for all practical purposes to disregard
the principle that that portion of a man's wages that he gives away . . . should
not be touched by the tax gatherer. Can it be possible that the masterminds
behind the scenes who determine the policy for the Treasury Department ...
want to cripple all of these worth-while institutions so that they must come to
the Federal Government for a subsidy?
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The tax concessions given to the voluntary sector are argued
on other grounds as well. The more prominently voiced concerns
are that the tax concessions: (1) are abused by taxpayers or insti-
tutions;7 (2) do not benefit all income classes; or (3) do not pro-
duce benefits worth their cost in foregone revenues.8 For example,
prominent among the arguments used to support the 1969 tax
rules for foundations were examples of individuals who retained
substantial control of their assets after setting up foundations and
receiving the associated tax benefits. That the direct beneficiaries
of these tax provisions were usually quite wealthy was not lost on
populists in Congress. Similarly, the issue of abuse of privileged
tax position is central to the current debate over the taxation of
the commercial income of nonprofit organizations. At issue in any
of these debates is not only the economic vitality of the nonprofit
sector but also the shape of an important component of American
public policy.
Like other kinds of public policy, tax policy directed toward
the voluntary sector can be evaluated using a number of different
yardsticks. One might empirically measure the tax law's impact
on the behavior or on the finances of nonprofit institutions. Taking
a normative perspective, one might use concepts of equity to ask
whether tax policy in this area is "fair." Presumably, these equity
concerns underlie the debate over "unfair competition"9 and the
taxation of commercial income earned by nonprofits. 10 Another
normative concern, and the aspect focused on in this paper, is the
efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Resource alloca-
tion - concerning, for example, the uses of labor and capital in
the economy - is affected by taxes in the same way that prices
affect the commodities that people purchase and wages affect the
7. See Bennett & Rudney, A Commerciality Test to Resolve the Commercial Non-
profit Issue, 36 TAX NOTES 1095, 1096 (Sept. 14, 1987)(The current tax law has created a
"public controversy about [the] competitive advantage of nonprofits in the marketplace.");
Klott, Tax Watch: Nonprofit Groups May Face a Tax, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1988, at D2,
col. I (small businessmen claim that a tax is needed to cure the "unfair competition" posed
by nonprofits).
8. Some argue that the services provided by nonprofits are lower in quality than the
services provided by for-profit firms. See, e.g., Herzlinger & Krasker, Who Profits from
Nonprofits?, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 93, 93 ("while nonprofit hospitals receive
more social subsidies than for-profits, they do not achieve better social results.").
9. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPETITION BETWEEN TAXA-
BLE BUSINESSES AND TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (February 1987)(Briefing Report to the
Joint Committee on Taxation, U.S. Congress).
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jobs that they take. Any policy that disturbs an otherwise well-
functioning price system creates "distortions" which tend to lower
economic welfare. There is a vast literature in public finance that
identifies the conditions under which taxes do and do not create
distortions. 1 The literature suggests that distortions arise when
taxes change the ratio of prices away from the value that would
otherwise exist in the absence of taxation. For example, consider a
pre-tax situation in which the price of apples is twice that of ba-
nanas. Taxes create distortions if they disturb this 2:1 ratio. There
are, however, a few commodities that a free functioning market
will always mis-allocate even in the absence of tax induced distor-
tions. Public goods are one such commodity, and overall economic
welfare will suffer unless public policy is used as a corrective mea-
sure.'2 One principal justification for using tax policy to subsidize
nonprofits is that it remedies this inefficiency.
This Article examines tax policy toward the nonprofit sector
through the economist's lens of efficiency. Without attempting to
construct a complete model of the sector, several apparent devia-
tions from efficiency are identified. Most of these distortions were
not intended by lawmakers, and their large impact makes them
worth considering. The first section of the Article surveys the
many roles assumed by the nonprofit sector in the United States."
This provides the needed perspective for analyzing public policy
and tax policy toward that sector. The'second section examines
some prominent apparent distortions that affect choices within the
voluntary sector.14 These distortions are distinguished from those
aspects of tax policy that tend to promote, rather than diminish,
efficiency. In the third section, the behavioral consequences of
those distortions are discussed.' 5 The concluding section notes the
relevance of the analysis to several current policy questions related
to the tax treatment of the voluntary sector. 6
11. See A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 482-518
(1980); H. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 291-343 (2d ed. 1988); Hochman & Rodgers, The
Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 1 (1977).
12. See A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 482-94.
13. See infra notes 17-47 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 48-88 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 89-135 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
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I. THE ROLE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND DISTORTIONS
A. Function and Shape of the Nonprofit Sector
Before looking at distortions, it is helpful to consider why
nonprofits exist in the first instance. The growing literature about
the nonprofit sector offers several theories.'7 Broadly speaking,
most of these theories suggest two principal reasons which explain
the existence of nonprofit organizations: market failure and gov-
ernment failure.
It is well known that freely operating markets, despite their
much-heralded advantages, fail to produce efficiency in resource
allocation under some conditions."8 One such market failure in-
volves public goods - commodities or services whose benefits flow
to all consumers, not just those who purchase them. This creates a
"free rider" problem which causes public goods to be under-sup-
plied in a free market. Those who would benefit from these goods
have an insufficient incentive to pay for them. 9 By default, the
government becomes the provider for public goods since it can use
its taxation power to make everyone pay the cost of providing the
goods.
Imperfect information is another cause of market failure.
Hansmann has argued that information asymmetry explains the
17. See generally THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (W. Powell ed.
1987)(offering several theories which explain the existence of nonprofit organizations). For
instance, one author justifies nonprofit organizations on three grounds:
(1) to perform public tasks that have been delegated to them by the state; (2) to
perform public tasks for which there is a demand that neither the state nor for-
profit organizations are willing to fulfill; or (3) to influence the direction of pol-
icy in the state, the for-profit sector, or other nonprofit organizations.
Hall, supra note 1, at 3.
18. Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 27, 29 (W. Powell ed. 1987)(because the market aims
to satisfy the median voter, other citizens' demands for goods and services will remain
unsatisfied).
19. Once a public "good is provided, the additional resource cost of another person
consuming the good is zero." H. ROSEN, supra note 11, at 62. See also Hansmann, The
Role of Nonprofit Enterprises, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
[lI]ndividuals have an incentive to contribute little or nothing toward the cost of
producing [public goods] for two reasons: first, the individual's contribution is
likely to be so small in proportion to the total that it will not appreciably affect
the amount of the good provided, and second, the individual will in any case be
able to enjoy the amounts of the good that are financed by the contributions of
others.
Id. at 848-49.
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existence of many nonprofit firms.2 0 Since nonprofit firms are pro-
hibited from distributing profits,2 nonprofit managers do not have
the same incentives to take advantage of uninformed consumers
that for-profit managers do.22 This explains why the nonprofit
form plays a vital role in markets where consumers have difficulty
assessing the quality of the service offered for sale.23
A second reason for the existence of nonprofit organizations
is the failure of government to provide an adequate amount of
goods and services to all of its citizens.2 4 Some citizens demand
more of a particular public service than others, but government
can generally provide only one common amount, leaving some citi-
zens with unfulfilled demand .2  As Weisbrod has argued, many
nonprofit organizations fill these gaps left by government.2
Two basic types of nonprofit institutions emerged in response
to these failures of the market and the government: public service
organizations and mutual benefit organizations.2 The former
would include the churches, hospitals, and charities that are com-
monly associated with the nonprofit sector.2 8  Except for
churches, 29 there is no special reason why many of these organiza-
tions exist in the nonprofit sector as opposed to the government.
The latter group includes clubs, unions, and other associations run
for the benefit of their members.30 In sum, public service organi-
zations undertake activities that have a significant public good
component, like many functions of government. Mutual benefit or-
20. Hansmann, supra note 19, at 862-63 (the inability of consumers to monitor the
quality and worth of services through private contract justifies the existence of commercial
honprofits).
21. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986)(to remain tax exempt, an organization must
make certain that it does not distribute any "part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual"). See also Hansmann, supra note 19, at
838 ("A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from distribut-
ing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it .
22. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 29.
23. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 19, at 866 n.90 (offering the example of a hos-
pital patient as a consumer lacking the knowledge and capacity to evaluate the service
being provided).
t; " ansmanh, gsuPra note 18, at 29.
26..: '. WtifSgaoDTHAE NONPROFIT ECONOMY (1987).
27. Bittker & kahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal
Income 'taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 304-07 (1976).
28. Id. at 305.
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. I (the establishment clause of the first amendment requires
the government to avoid activities relating to the establishment of religious organizations).
30. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 27, at 306.
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ganizations, on the other hand, tend to have little impact on indi-
viduals outside the organization's membership. 1
B. Tax Policy in the United States
In the United States, federal tax policy toward the voluntary
sector has two basic components: tax exemption for the nonprofit
organizations themselves32 and deductions for donors who make
contributions.3 3 At the state level, nonprofit organizations are gen-
erally exempt from state corporate income taxation3 4 and from
sales and property taxation. 5
Both of these components - the exemption and the deduc-
tion - are surrounded with numerous exceptions and restrictions.
The most important ones define the range of allowable deductions.
For instance, deductability will be denied unless the gift goes to a
group officially recognized by the tax code.38 A group that at-
tempts "to influence legislation" can lose its favored tax status.3 7
Even if these and other impediments to deductibility are met, the
taxpayer might nonetheless be precluded from taking the full de-
duction for his donation.38 There are restrictions placed on a non-
profit's tax exempt status as well. For example, federal law pro-
vides for the taxation of so-called unrelated business income.39 It
also subjects private foundations to an excise tax40 plus an elabo-
rate set of extra requirements. 1
31. Id. at 305-06.
32. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1986)("An organization [listed herein] shall be exempt from
taxation .... ").
33. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (1986)("There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable
contribution ... "). The deduction may be used to reduce the tax liability of individuals,
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (1986), corporations, I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (1986), and estates, I.R.C. §
2055(a) (1986).
34. See E. LASHBROOKE, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 97 (1985).
35. Id. at 108-17.
36. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1986)(defining the eligible groups). These groups correspond
roughly to the "public service" organizations discussed earlier. See supra note 19 and ac-
companying text.
37. 1.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (1986).
38. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) & (2) (1986)(expressing a percentage limit on deductibility
in terms of the taxpayer's "contribution base").
39. I.R.C. § 501(b) (1986).
40. I.R.C. § 4940 (1986).
41. I.R.C. §§ 4941-4948 (1986); see also C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 263
(many of these measures were intended to limit the potential for abuse of foundations by
donors).
1988-891
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
C. The Rationale for Tax Policy
As discussed earlier, market failure and government failure
are two explanations for the existence of nonprofit organizations.
Tax policy toward the nonprofit sector thus may seem as a correc-
tive measure for this basic problem in resource allocation. Assum-
ing this stylized description of the structure and function of the
nonprofit sector is reasonably accurate, one could easily imagine
public policies which would enhance the nonprofit sector's opera-
tion. Public policy could be used, for example, to provide certain
kinds of information that would lessen the likelihood of informa-
tional asymmetry. Product labelling requirements and inspections
would assist on this score. As another example, the legal system
could be used to enforce the nondistribution requirement for non-
profit organizations."2 Of the many public policy options, this arti-
cle examines tax policy and the justification for the way tax law is
used in the nonprofit sector.
One rationale for using tax policy in the voluntary sector is
equity. A prominent argument offered to justify the income tax
deduction on equity grounds is that money given away by the do-
nor should not properly be counted in his income. 3 Equity may
also be the reason for subjecting the commercial income of non-
profits to the same type of taxation that for-profit competitors
must pay.44 The other principal rationale is based on efficiency -
the focus of this Article.
Based on economic efficiency alone, a persuasive argument
can be made for the use of tax policy in the nonprofit sector.
Many of the products and services supplied by public service orga-
nizations are "public goods." As noted above, public goods and
other goods with beneficial "externalities" tend to be undersup-
plied by an unregulated market because those who benefit from
them have insufficient incentive to pay for them. 5 One solution
offered by applied microeconomics is to subsidize the production
or consumption of such goods. The greater the external benefit
relative to the cost to the consumer, the greater the subsidy should
be.46 It is at this point that tax policy comes into play. Any tax
42. The nondistribution requirement is explained at supra note 21.
43. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309,
346 (1972).
44. Id. at 363.
45. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
46. C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 281-84.
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system as pervasive as ours is an ideal vehicle for granting such
subsidies. An individual or organization can receive a subsidy sim-
ply by having its tax liability reduced (i.e. deduction for donors
and exemption for the charitable organization). Tax policy toward
the voluntary sector becomes, then, a corrective measure for a ba-
sic problem in resource allocation, namely, the undersupply of
goods with beneficial externalities.
A risk inherent in using tax policy to subsidize desirable ac-
tivities is the possibility that distortions will be introduced into the
market. Distortions harm resource allocation by subverting the
function of the price system; price information becomes a twisted
and unreliable conveyer of information to firms and households. If
there are no other forces disturbing the allocation of resources, the
ratio of the prices of two commodities after taxation should be the
same as it was before taxation. If not, the taxes are said to distort
the choice between the commodities.47 Distortions caused by tax
policy are usually not intended by lawmakers. That appears to be
the case for tax policy toward the voluntary sector. Tax features
that are justifiable on the basis of efficiency, if not created for that
reason, nevertheless have the effect of creating distortions. The
following section describes six of the most important distortions
created by nonprofit tax law.
II. SIx PROMINENT DISTORTIONS
There are many distortions that today's tax system introduces
into the market. Of the six discussed in this section, three are cre-
ated by the individual income tax, and the remaining three are the
result of other taxes.
A. Distortions Created by the Individual Income Tax
The individual income tax creates three prominent distor-
tions. First, it distorts the price of cash donations. Second, it cre-
ates a variety of prices for the taxpayer considering a gift of ap-
preciated property. Finally, it distorts the cost of donating time in
comparison to a gift of money.
1. The Price of Cash Donations
Under the individual income tax, taxpayers have the option
47. See, e.g., H. ROSEN, supra note 11, at 297-98.
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of itemizing their personal deductions.4" Those who decide to
itemize are permitted to deduct their charitable contributions."9
For taxpayers who itemize, a contributed dollar ends up costing
less than a dollar once the reduction in tax is counted.50 If a tax-
payer's marginal tax rate is, for example, 15 percent, there is an
implicit subsidy of 15 cents per dollar of giving. Each dollar of
contribution costs only 85 cents, which is the dollar minus the 15
cents of tax savings. This 85 cents per dollar of giving can be
viewed as the "price" of making a contribution in the same sense
that apples might be priced at 89 cents a pound. Distortions in the
price of giving can lead to inefficiencies just as distortions in the
price of food or other products can lead to over- or under-
consumption.
Distortions in the price of giving arise because different peo-
ple face different subsidy rates (and prices) which bear little rela-
tionship to any objective characteristics of the gift. Two factors
determine the subsidy rate applied to a person's contributions:
itemization status5' and the marginal tax rate applicable to the
taxpayer. 52 Since only those who take itemized deductions can re-
duce •their taxable income when they make gifts, 3 a nonitemizer
receives no subsidy and his price of giving a dollar is the full dol-
lar. In 1985, three out of every five taxpayers were nonitemizers
and thus faced this full dollar price.54 For the minority of taxpay-
ers who do itemize, the subsidy rate is equal to the marginal tax
rate. The price of giving for itemizers varies inversely with the
marginal tax rate. Therefore, those in the highest tax brackets en-
48. The elective nature of the itemization decision is spelled out in I.R.C. § 63(e)
(1986). By choosing to itemize, the taxpayer gains access to numerous deductions. I.R.C.
§§ 161 & 211 (1986)(allowing itemizing taxpayers to use the deductions specified in §§
162-96 & 212-19). Taxpayers who do not itemize calculate their tax per I.R.C. § 63(b) &
(c) (1986).
49. It is the fact of itemization that allows deductability for charitable donations
under § 170. See supra notes 33 & 48 and accompanying text.
50. C. Clotfelter, Voltage for the Thousand Points of Light: Thoughts on Federal
Tax Policy Toward the Nonprofit Sector 7 (December 6, 1988)(paper presented at the
December 27, 1988 meeting of the American Economic Association).
51. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
52. The marginal tax rates for individuals, estates and trusts are found in I.R.C. § I
(1986). The corporate marginal tax rates are codified in I.R.C. § 11 (1986).
53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54. Tax returns in 1985 totalled 101,660,287. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATIS-
TICS OF INCOME - 1985 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 15, table 1.2, col. 1 (1988).
Of this total, 61,812,103 returns were nonitemized. See infra note 107. Thus, three out of
every five taxpayers did not itemize.
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joy the lowest price per dollar of charitable giving. Because the
range of marginal tax rates was reduced significantly in the 1981
and 1986 tax acts,55 the variation in the price of donating is now
more limited. As shown in the fourth column of Table 1, however,
it is nonetheless substantial.5 The table illustrates how the price
55. Prior to 1977 the top marginal tax rate for unmarried individuals was 87%. In
that year, however, the rate was reduced to 70%. Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 101(a), 1977 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (91 Stat.)
126, 129-30 (amending I.R.C. § l(c)). The next reduction occurred in 1981 when the rate
was changed downward to 50%. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 101(a), 1981 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (95 Stat.) 172, 178-80 (amending
I.R.C. § 1(c)). This rate has been reduced even further and it now stands at 28%. I.R.C. §
l(c) (1986).
56.
Table 1
Net Cost per Dollar of Contributions
Six Illustrative Taxpaying Couples, 1988
Taxable Itemization Marginal(a) Net Cost of Giving One Dollar(b)
Income Status Tax Rate Cash Asset with Asset with
a gain-to- a gain-to-
value ratio value ratio
of 0.5 (c) of 0.9 (d)
$15,000 Nonitemizer 15% $1.00 $ .925 $1.00
$40,000 Nonitemizer 28% $1.00 $ .86 $1.00
$40,000 Itemizer 28% $ .72 $ .58 $ .72
$100,000 Itemizer 33% $ .67 $ .505 $ .67
$250,000 Itemizer 28% $ .72 $ .58 $ .72
$250,000 Itemizer 21% $ .79 $ .79 $ .979
subject
to alternative
minimum tax
(a) Calculated for joint return with two dependents. Ratio of itemized deductions assumed
to be equal to that for the Adjusted Gross Income class in 1986.
(b) The price of giving a dollar of cash is $(1 - m) for itemizers, where m is the marginal
tax rate. It is $1 for nonitemizers. In general, the price of giving assets is P = 1 - mRg* for
nonitemizers and P = I- m - mRg* for itemizers under the regular tax, where m is the
marginal tax rate, R I if the asset would otherwise have been sold, R = 0 if the asset
would otherwise have been bequeathed, and g* is the asset's gain-to-value ratio when sold.
Under the alternative minimum tax, the price is P= I - .21 - .2lRg* + .21g, where g is the
current gain-to-value ratio. See C. CLOTFELrER, supra note 2 for a discussion of the price
of giving assets.
Two cases are used to illustrate the cost of making gifts of stock. That shown in column
(d) assumes that the couple would otherwise have kept the asset until death (R=0) and
1988-89]
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of giving differs among taxpayers by showing the prices for six
hypothetical taxpaying couples. In contrast to nonitemizers for
whom gifts cost the full amount, itemizers subject to an effective
marginal tax rate of 33 percent give up only 67 cents for every
dollar contributed to a charitable organization. Because the tax
system encourages contributions by means of an itemized deduc-
tion, taxpayers who make similar charitable contributions face
different prices. The resulting distortion is qualitatively no differ-
ent from a situation where some people in a store pay higher
prices for apples than other customers. This inconsistent treatment
is undesirable because it causes inefficient allocation of resources.
2. Gifts of Appreciated Assets
The individual income tax system encourages donations in the
form of appreciated property such as stock or works of art as com-
pared to cash. It creates this favoritism by subsidizing gifts of
property in two distinct ways. First, the taxpayer receives a deduc-
tion for the market value of the asset.5 Next, the government
generally forgives the tax liability on any capital gains that would
have been due had the taxpayer sold the asset.58 A few examples
will illustrate the powerful incentive taxpayers have to contribute
appreciated property instead of cash.
Consider a taxpayer who owns stock worth $1000, for which
he paid $500. In 1988, if the taxpayer faced a tax rate of 28 per-
cent and chose to sell the stock, he would owe $140 in tax to cover
the capital gains ($500 x .28). If the taxpayer instead gave the
stock to a charitable organization, the taxpayer's gross cost of
that the current gain-to-value ratio (g) is 0.9. Thus P = 1 - m under the regular tax and P
= 1 - .21+21(.9) under the alternative minimum tax. That shown in column (c) assumes
the asset would otherwise have been sold immediately (R =-1; g*--g) and that the gain-to-
value ratio is 0.5. Thus P = I - m - 0.5m and P = 1 - .21 under the normal and alternative
taxes, respectively.
(c) It is assumed that taxpayers in this column would have sold the asset and paid tax on
capital gain if they had not donated the asset.
(d) It is assumed that taxpayers in this column would have bequeathed the asset thereby
escaping capital gain taxation if they had not donated the asset.
57. "Deduction is allowed under § 170(a) whether the taxpayer makes his contribu-
tion in money or in 'property.' Where the property has appreciated in the taxpayer's hands
• . . the full value of the property (not merely its cost) is deductible . M. CHIREL-
STEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 150 (5th ed. 1988).
58. "[T]he appreciation is not regarded as realized by virtue of the gift." Id. (em-
phasis in original).
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$1000 would be reduced by the value of the deduction, $280, plus
the capital gains tax that would otherwise have been due, $140.
This makes the net cost of the gift only $580 ($1000 - $280 -
$140).
A different set of circumstances would change this net cost.
For example, consider a second taxpayer who holds a different as-
set that is worth $1000 but was originally purchased at a cost of
only $100. In contrast to the first taxpayer, who contemplated
selling the asset, this taxpayer plans to leave the asset to her heirs
when she dies. If she changes her mind and donates the asset as a
charitable contribution, she saves no capital gains tax because no
such tax is applied to property transfered at death.59 She does
benefit from her section 170 deduction - a $280 value if her in-
come is taxed at the 28 % marginal rate. Therefore, the net cost of
the gift is $720 ($1000 - $280), the same as if she had given cash.
These two hypothetical cases capture an important bit of reality:
the assets in a portfolio that have appreciated the most are least
likely to be sold because taxpayers can avoid the capital gains tax
altogether on those assets by donating them to charity or by leav-
ing them to their heirs.
The final two columns of Table 160 show the wide variation in
cost for couples who make donations of appreciated property. The
fifth column corresponds to the first example illustrated above
(gain-to-value ratio of .5 and taxpayer would have sold the asset
had he not donated it). The sixth column corresponds to the sec-
ond example illustrated above (gain-to-value ratio of .9 and tax-
payer would have bequeathed the asset had she not donated it).
As in the case of cash gifts, there is substantial variation in the
net costs faced by the six hypothetical couples. The taxpayers who
fall within column five experience the wider range of donative
cost. It varies from 50.5 cents per dollar for taxpayers in the high-
est tax bracket to 92.5 cents for nonitemizing taxpayers in the
lowest bracket. The taxpayers grouped under column six are con-
fronted with a smaller variation in price, from 67 cents to the full
one dollar price. In general, the net cost for these taxpayers is the
59. The Internal Revenue Code taxes the individual only after the income has been
"realized" by her. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 212 (1920)(Holding that
no income tax could be levied because the taxpayer had "not realized . . . any income in
the transaction."). No tax is assessed for property passed at death because "there is no
realization of gain . . . by [the] decedent ...." M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 57, at 59.
60. Table I is reproduced supra note 56.
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
same as the net cost of giving cash. Thus, column six matches
column four except for the relatively few high-income taxpayers
subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax."1
Table 1 clearly shows that the federal income tax, even in its
"simplified" post-reform incarnation, creates a variety of prices
for taxpayers considering charitable contributions. Because differ-
ent taxpayers face different prices, these distortions create the
danger of inefficient resource allocation in society. In addition, the
heavy tax subsidies encourage taxpayers to contribute appreciated
property instead of cash. For nonprofit organizations, receiving
gifts in asset form is no more than an inconvenience when they
are marketable assets such as stock. But this bias in favor of ap-
preciated assets may have a significant impact on the asset hold-
ings of some nonprofit organizations, those which receive gifts of
real property, closely-held businesses, or works of art.
3. Time vs. Money
The complaint is sometimes made that the income tax allows
a deduction for gifts of money but not for time spent in volunteer
service.62 In fact, closer to the opposite is the case. Volunteering is
accorded an automatic deduction for all taxpayers because the
value of the service rendered to a nonprofit organization - ap-
proximately, what the taxpayer could have earned if she had
worked instead - is not taxed in the first instance.63 The income
61. The Alternative Minimum Tax is found in I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (1986). It is intended
to narrow some of the "loopholes" customarily used by wealthy individuals and corpora-
tions to avoid paying income tax.
To accomplish this the Code establishes what amounts to a second tax system -
one that defines the income base more broadly than the regular tax system, but
then applies a lower rate of tax to that broadened income-base. Taxpayers other-
wise benefitting from certain preferences [i.e. charitable deductions under § 170]
are required to compute their regular tax liability (on the narrower base) and
their minimum tax liability (on the broader base), compare the two, and finally
pay whichever is the greater . . . . IT]he minimum tax [calculated per § 55]
establishes a floor below which the taxpayer's actual liability may not fall.
M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 57, at 160 (footnote omitted).
When applicable, the Alternative Minimum Tax uses a process of "constructive realiza-
tion" to reduce the § 170 tax subsidy enjoyed by donors who give appreciated property to
charity. See I.R.C. § 57(a)(6)(A) (1986).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1976)("No deduction is allowable
for contribution of services."). See also C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 151.
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(c) (as amended in 1979)("The value of services is not in-
cludible in gross income when such services are rendered. . . gratuitously to [a charitable]
organization .... ").
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tax in effect allows all taxpayers to spend an "extra" hour doing
volunteer work, implicitly contributing the forgone salary to the
charity, and in the process leaving the amount of tax owed to the
government unchanged. Therefore, all volunteering is fully "de-
ductible" in the sense that no tax is levied on the value of the
contributed work.
For the itemizing taxpayer who can deduct her charitable do-
nations from taxable income, the income tax is symmetrical in its
treatment of gifts of time and money. The taxpayer can work the
hour and contribute the proceeds or volunteer the hour - the tax
consequences are the same. For the nonitemizing taxpayer who
cannot deduct his contributions, however, the income tax creates a
distortion in favor of gifts of time.64 Since well over half of Ameri-
can taxpayers do not itemize their deductions,65 this distortion
touches a large number of households.
B. Distortions Created by Other Taxes
Taxes other than the individual income tax also create distor-
tions. The corporate income tax, for instance, raises the cost of
doing business for for-profit firms as compared to nonprofits. State
and local taxes also create distortions because they differ from one
locality to another. Thus, the relative cost of operating for-profit
and nonprofit firms differs by state and local jurisdiction. Finally,
the federally-mandated ceiling limits on tax-exempt bonds and
lobbying restrictions introduce yet further distortions into the
market.
1. Exemption From the Corporate Income Tax
Nonprofits are not strictly "nonprofit" because they are per-
mitted to earn net income. The distinguishing difference between
nonprofits and for-profits is that nonprofits cannot distribute their
income to shareholders.6 " Another difference is that for-profit cor-
porations are taxed on their income6 7 while nonprofit organiza-
tions pay no corporate income tax on net income they earn as a
by-product of their principal, tax-exempt function. 8 Only the in-
64. For an analysis of this distortion, see Long, Income Tax Effects on Donor Choice
of Money and Time Contributions, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 207, 207-11 (1977).
65. See supra note 54.
66. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
67. I.R.C. § 11 (1986).
68. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1986).
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come deemed not to be directly related to the nonprofit organiza-
tions' tax-exempt purposes is taxed. This special tax is called the
Unrelated Business Income Tax. 9
Of concern here is the type of distortion this treatment cre-
ates. Where there are two otherwise similar organizations, one
taxed on net income and one not, it is not hard to see that a dis-
tortion is introduced. The tax raises the cost of doing business for
the for-profit firms but not for the nonprofits. At the margin, this
difference in tax treatment could increase the amount of capital
going into nonprofit as opposed to for-profit organizations in the
same industry. The relative impact of this effect depends on the
rate of profit in the for-profit industry. If the profit rate is small,
the tax, and thus the distortion, will also tend to be small. As
stated above, these general statements apply to firms operating in
essentially the same industry, such as nursing care or hospitals.
The potential for serious distortion is less in an industry domi-
nated by nonprofit firms, as in the case of research universities.
The Unrelated Business Income Tax reduces this distortion
but does not eliminate it. Only a portion of the nonprofit's income
will be unrelated business income. 70 Thus, a nonprofit that has
large income overall but only a small unrelated business income
will enjoy the lowest marginal tax rates.71 This creates a situation
where the tax rate on the nonprofit firm's business income will
almost always be lower than the tax rate applied to otherwise sim-
ilar for-profit firms.
2. Exemption from State and Local Taxes
Every U.S. state grants tax exemptions to nonprofit organiza-
tions, but practices differ widely. 2 State exemption is based on
neither the Constitution nor common law, but rather on tradi-
tion.7 In the case of educational institutions, one authority has
69. I.R.C. §§ 501(b) & 511-514 (1986).
70. Unrelated Business Income is defined in I.R.C. §§ 511(a) & 512(a) (1986)(in-
come derived from a business that is not "substantially related" to the organization's chari-
table purpose).
71. The corporate tax rates are 15, 25 and 34 percent. A nonprofit must earn more
than $50,000 in unrelated business income before it moves out of the 15% marginal tax
rate. I.R.C. § l1(b)(1) (1986).
72. For an overview of the exemption practices, see E. LASHBROOKE, supra note 34,
at 97-108.
73. "The exemption of religious, educational, and charitable institutions from prop-
erty taxation has existed from 'time out of mind.'" Gabler & Shannon, supra note 3, at
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said that the "principle of exemption of educational institutions
from taxation has been so grounded in the nature of our Govern-
ment as to represent a practically irrevocable law." 4 Based on one
estimate of tax-exempt property, as much as a ninth of all such
property may be so classified due to the nonprofit exemption."
Assessing the impact of this tax policy raises many. of the
same issues arising under the federal corporate income tax
scheme. For example, if two otherwise similar firms are treated
differently for the purpose of property taxation, market distortions
might alter the allocation of capital between the taxed and un-
taxed firms. An additional potential for distortion is created by
the variations in tax treatment among the states. In the early
1970s, for example, thirty-four states exempted YMCAs and
YWCAs from property taxation while 16 states did not.7 Income-
producing property of educational institutions was exempt in 11
states but not in 39,77 and so on. As a result of these inconsisten-
cies, the relative cost of operating for-profit and nonprofit firms
differs by state and local jurisdiction and this hampers the ability
of the market to allocate social resources efficiently.
3. Debt Ceiling Limits and Lobbying Restrictions Placed on
Nonprofits
There are other distortions of a smaller magnitude that are
created by the tax system. One obvious distortion introduced by
the 1986 tax law is the $150 million cap on total tax-exempt bor-
rowing applicable to each educational institution. 8 Otherwise sim-
ilar institutions now face different costs of borrowing. These diver-
gences arise between the relatively few private institutions already
over the borrowing limit on the one hand and all public universi-
ties and remaining private ones on the other.
Another distortion is induced by the lobbying restrictions.
Most 501(c)(3) organizations are permitted to engage in lobbying
2536.
74. Persons, Osborn, & Feldmen, Criteria for Exemption Under Section 501 (c)(3), in
IV RESEARCH PAPERS: SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND
PUBLIC NEEDS 1909, 1923 (Dep't of the Treasury 1977)(footnote omitted).
75. Gabler & Shannon, supra note 3, at 2535 (one-third of all property is tax-ex-
empt and one-third of this exempt property can be traced to the exemption of private
holdings).
76. Gabler & Shannon, supra note 3, at 2541 (Table 3).
77. Id.
78. I.R.C. § 145(b) (1986).
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as long as it is "minor." 9 By contrast, for-profit firms face no
limit on their lobbying activities and they are permitted to deduct
many of the associated costs.80 Consider, for example, an individ-
ual who wishes to contribute to a firm that will influence a legisla-
tive body through lobbying. If the itemizing taxpayer chooses a
nonprofit organization and the organization has not reached its
lobbying limit then the federal government subsidizes her contri-
bution with the section 170 deduction. She gives up $(1-m) for
every dollar spent on lobbying, where m is her marginal tax rate.
This net cost is the same as making any kind of donation to the
organization. If the nonprofit has reached its lobbying limit, how-
ever, it can only lobby by setting up separate political units. These
units are not eligible for deductible contributions. 81 Without the
section 170 government subsidy, she pays a full dollar for each
dollar spent on lobbying. If instead the taxpayer can persuade a
for-profit corporation to do her lobbying, she will be able to have
it done at a lower cost. This follows because each dollar spent by
the for-profit firm on lobbying is deductible under the corporate
tax.82 Further savings are obtained because the money spent on
79. Nonprofits are permitted to use a limited portion of their resources for lobbying.
I.R.C. § 4911(c)(2) & (4) (1986). If they exceed this ceiling they are subject to "a tax
equal to 25 percent of the amount of the excess lobbying expenditures .... " I.R.C. §
4911 (a)(1) (1986). In certain circumstances the nonprofit may forfeit its tax exempt status
for overstepping the limitations on its political activities. I.R.C. § 501(h) (1986). See also
Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Federal and State
Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 67, 90-91 (W. Powell ed.
1987)(summarizing the tax penalties triggered when nonprofits engage in excessive lobby-
ing activities).
80. I.R.C. § 162(e) (1986). The expense involved when the business lobbies either
the state or federal legislature may be deducted. I.R.C. § 162(e)(1) (1986). Certain ex-
penses, although political in nature, are nondeductible. For instance, money spent in a "po-
litical campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office" may not be deducted. I.R.C.
§ 162(e)(2)(A) (1986). Similarly, money spent "to influence the general public ... with
respect to legislative matters" may not be deducted. I.R.C. § 162(e)(2)(B) (1986).
81. A § 501(c)(3) nonprofit that has reached its lobbying limit can set up a §
501(c)(4) nonprofit to conduct all further lobbying. Contributions to this separate nonprofit
firm will not, however, be deductible. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash-
ington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
For purposes of our analysis, there are two principal differences between §
501(c)(3) organizations and § 501(c)(4) organizations. Taxpayers who contrib-
ute to § 501(c)(3) organizations are permitted by § 170(c)(2) to deduct the
amount of their contributions on their federal income tax returns, while contri-
butions to § 501(c)(4) organizations are not deductible. Section 501(c)(4) orga-
nizations, but not § 501(c)(3) organizations, are permitted to engage in substan-
tial lobbying to advance their exempt purposes.
Id. at 543.
82. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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lobbying was not taxed at the individual level as dividends.8 3 The
cost to the taxpayer for each dollar the corporation devotes to its
lobbying activities is $(1-m)(1-t), where m is her marginal tax
rate and t is the corporate marginal tax rate. A simple calculation
will show that it is cheaper to do lobbying through for-profit orga-
nizations, and that this difference grows even greater where the
nonprofit has reached its limit of allowable lobbying. If the per-
sonal tax rate is 28 percent and the corporate rate is 34 percent
then: (1) the net cost of for-profit lobbying is 48 cents per dollar;84
(2) the net cost of nonprofit lobbying is 72 cents per dollar if the
lobbying limit has not been reached; 5 and, (3) the net cost of
nonprofit lobbying is the full dollar if the lobbying limit has been.
reached. 6
Two distortions are introduced into the market by this treat-
ment: those between lobbying and other activities within nonprofit
organizations and those between nonprofit and for-profit firms in.
the net cost of lobbying. The seriousness of these distortions de-
pends on the importance one attaches to the lobbying activity of
nonprofit organizations. This issue was addressed directly by the
Supreme Court in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Washington.8 There, the Court implied that the lobbying activi-
ties of nonprofits are not valued as highly as other functions un-'
dertaken by nonprofits. The Court reasoned that this was the
judgment of Congress because that body "chose not to subsidize
lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities that
non-profit organizations undertake to promote the public
welfare." '
III. SOME (MOSTLY UNINTENDED) ,UFFECTS
The previous section identified instances in which the tax sysi
tem has distorted resource allocation in the voluntary sector of the
economy. This section estimates the actual effect of these distor -
tions on individual behavior and on the behavior of economic insti-
83. This assumes that the corporation withheld money that might have been used to,
pay its shareholder a dividend and used it instead to lobby. By removing this step, a level of
tax was avoided. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (1986)(dividends received by an individual arer
includable in the individual's gross income).
84. $(1-.28)(1-.34) = $0.4752.
85. $(I-.28) = $0.72
86. See supra note 81.
87. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
88. Id. at 544.
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tutions. For the most part these descriptions are qualitative, since
few econometric estimates are available. This section identifies six
likely effects of the combined distortions described above.
A. Capriciousness
One of the two central planks in American tax policy toward
the voluntary sector is the income tax deduction given to donors
for their charitable contributions.8 One consequence of using the
deduction to encourage contributions is a certain whimsy in the
resulting pattern of subsidies. Only itemizers are allowed to use
the deduction, and subsidy rates for itemizers depend on taxpay-
ers' marginal tax rates. These aspects cause otherwise similar in-
dividuals to face different net costs of making contributions. In
particular, home owners - by virtue of their usual status as
itemizers - are usually subsidized in their donations more gener-
ously than renters since the latter usually do not itemize their de-
ductions.90 Consider, for example, the two hypothetical couples in
Table 191 who have incomes of $40,000. Although both face the
same 28 percent marginal tax rate, the nonitemizing couple's
price of making gifts is over a third larger than the price faced by
the itemizing couple. Thus, itemization status - determined by
factors quite unrelated to the purported worthiness of a person's
donation - is a critical determinant of the subsidy rate accorded
to that donation.
Added to the inordinate importance of itemization is the sub-
stantial variation over time in the number of taxpayers who fall
into this category. Over the past four decades, the percentage of
taxpayers who itemize has fluctuated as a result of two forces:
inflation, which tends to erode the real value of the standard de-
duction and thus makes it advantageous for more taxpayers to
itemize; and Congress, which has periodically increased the stan-
dard deduction (and adjusted the width of tax brackets) to offset
this inflationary effect. 2 Although these changes in the law have
89. The other plank is tax exemption for the donee. For further discussion of these
two subsidies, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
90. Homeowners are more likely than renters to be itemizers because homeowners
can deduct their interest payments on mortgages - an amount which, when itemized, puts
them over the amount of the standard deduction. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (1986)(interest paid
on mortgages is deductible).
91. Table I is located supra note 56.
92. For a general treatment of the effect of inflation and tax cuts, see Clotfelter, Tax
Cut Meets Bracket Creep: The Rise and Fall of Marginal Tax Rates, 1964-1984, 12 PUB.
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tended to neutralize the effects of inflation over time, the process
has occurred in fits and starts, resulting in substantial variation in
the percentage of itemizers among the population of taxpayers.
The percentage of itemizers increased from 16.4 percent in 194811
to 42.5 percent in 1962,1" then dropped to 40.9 percent in 1966,11
then rose again to an all-time high of 48.0 percent in 1970,91 after
which it fell again to 28.7 percent in 1978.7 The percentage then
rose steadily, to 39.2 percent in 1985,98 but the 1986 tax act will
probably cut the percentage to near 30 percent in 1988. Combined
with variations in effective marginal tax rates - which change
over time due to inflation and legislation - these changes in the
coverage of itemization mean that the net cost of contributing is
constantly fluctuating for a substantial portion of the population
for reasons unrelated to the voluntary sector itself. This occurs
because the income tax subsidizes charitable giving by granting a
deduction only to itemizers." This capriciousness could be cured
if the subsidy were given instead through a credit because all tax-
payers would then face the same unchanging net cost of
contributions.100
B. Plutocractic Bias
William Vickrey's phrase, "plutocratic bias," '' captures a
second apparent effect of the existing tax policy toward charitable
giving. Because the net cost of giving falls as the taxpayer's in-
come level increases, the section 170 deduction has been criticized
for being an "upside-down" subsidy. 02 Musgrave and Musgrave
FIN. Q. 131 (1984); C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 134-35.
93. C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 136 (table 3.12).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1985 INDIVIDUAL IN-
COME TAX RETURNS (1988). The total number of individual itemized returns for 1985 was
39,848,184. Id. at 60, table 2.1, col. 1. The total individual returns for 1985 were
101,660,287. Id. at 15, table 1.2, col. 1. 39,848,184 divided by 101,660,287 yields a figure
of 39.2%.
99. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. There was, of course, a brief experi-
ment during 1985 and 1986 which allowed nonitemizers to deduct their contributions. This
interlude further contributed to recent fluctuations in the net cost of contributions. See
infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
100. C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 103-04.
101. W. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 131 (1947).
102. S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 72 (1985).
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wryly note that "the opportunity cost of virtue falls as one moves
up the income scale."' 03 Combined with the special rules for do-
nating property and the ability to establish foundations, this in-
verse pattern of subsidy rates raises what Simon half-facetiously
called "the spectre of privilege."104 Another look at Table 11'1 will
amply illustrate how the subsidy varies with income. Those at the
bottom of the income scale (earning below $40,000 per year) typi-
cally bear a full dollar's cost for each dollar donated, while those
near the upper end (earning over $40,000 per year) seldom do.
The assumption implicit in the table, that nonitemizers are clus-
tered in the lower income brackets, is very realistic. In 1986, for
example, only 14 percent of taxpayers making between $10,000
and $11,000 itemized their deductions, compared to 88 percent,
for those with incomes between $40,000 and $50,000 and 97 per-
cent for those in the $75,000 to $100,000 class."0 6 In 1985, the
average nonitemizer had an income of $11,700,107 compared to
$39,700 for the average itemizer. 0 8 One has only to compare the
collection plates in prosperous churches with those in churches
serving poor neighborhoods to see this income-related bias. The
former are filled with checks, which leave a neat paper trail for
the tax accountant, while the latter contain mostly cash. If this
plutocratic bias was only an equity issue then the remedy would
be simple - amend the tax code to effect any desired change in
103. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
348 (4th ed. 1984).
104. Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Income Tax, in THE PROBATE
LAWYER 5 (1978).
105. Table I is reproduced supra note 56.
106. Kalish & Shiley, Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data. 1986,
STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL., Winter 1987, at 39, 45, 50.
107. The actual figures are as follows:
The adjusted gross income (AGI) for nonitemized returns was $723,364,581,000. This
figure was calculated by subtracting the AGI of itemized returns ($1,582,586,902,000, IN-
TERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 98, at 60, table 2.1, col. 2), from total AGI
($2,305,951,483,000, id. at 15, table 1.2, col. 2).
The number of nonitemized returns was 61,812,103. This figure was calculated by
subtracting itemized returns (39,848,184, id. at 60, table 2.1, col. 1) from total returns
(101,660,287, id. at 15, table 1.2, col. 1).
723,364,581,000. divided by 61,812,103 yields an average income figure of
$11,702.64 per nonitemized return.
108. The actual figures are as follows:
Adjusted gross income for itemized returns was $1,582,586,902,000. Id. at 60, table
2.1, col. 2. The number of itemized returns was 39,848,184. Id. at 60, table 2.1, col. 1.
$1,582,586,902,000 divided by 39,848,184 yields an average income figure of $39,715.41
per itemized return.
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after-tax income. The real issue, however, is efficiency and the dif-
ferential rates of subsidy. Charities favored by the rich simply re-
ceive more favorable rates of subsidy through the itemized deduc-
tion than those favored by the poor.
It is clear that a bias exists, but more analysis is necessary to
determine its effects. If households at lower incomes were entirely
insensitive to tax subsidies then the existing income-related bias
would be a moot issue due to its negligible impact on the amount
or distribution of charitable giving, or on the efficiency of the tax
subsidy. Some observers argue that this is the case and that low-
income donors are insensitive to the tax-defined net cost of giv-
ing.109 I believe there is little support for that view. Simply be-
cause there has been little subsidy given to gifts made by those at
the lower end of the income scale does not mean that those donors
would not respond to incentives in a manner similar to their heav-
ily-subsidized high income counterparts. The little econometric ev-
idence on the charitable giving of lower income individuals has in
fact produced mixed results concerning the magnitude of the price
elasticity of giving.110 The closest thing to a controlled experiment
that has ever occurred to test the potential responsiveness of lower
income donors was Congress' brief experiment with the charitable
deduction for nonitemizers. In 1985, nonitemizers could deduct 50
percent of their charitable gifts, and in 1986, they were allowed a
full deduction, after which time the deduction was dropped.,
Tax statistics for these two years offer a unique glimpse into the
behavior of nonitemizers. Itemizers, who saw no significant
change in tax treatment between one year and the next, actually
decreased their average giving in virtually every income class over
this two-year period." 2 In contrast, nonitemizers - all of whom
experienced a one-time decrease in the net cost of giving - in-
109. C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 66 (two studies are cited to support the pre-
vailing view prior to 1975 that there was little if any price sensitivity among low-income
donors).
110. For a discussion of price elasticity, see Clotfelter & Steuerle, Charitable Con-
tributions, in How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 403 (H. Aaron & J. Pechman
eds. 1981). See also C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 71 (responsiveness of lower-income
individuals has been imprecisely determined).
Ill. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121(a), 95 Stat.
172, 196 (codified at I.R.C. § 170(i))(A negligible tax subsidy was given to non-itemizing
charitable donors for the tax years 1982-84. They received a 50% subsidy in 1985 and a
100% subsidy in 1986. The Act also contained a sunset provision in subsection (4) which
terminated the subsidy altogether on December 31, 1986.).
112. C. Clotfelter, supra note 50, at 13.
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creased their average contributions in every income class above$7,000.11 While these findings do not prove that lower income
households respond to tax subsidies in the same way as middle
and upper income households, they do suggest that donors at all
income levels respond to tax-induced incentives to contribute.'14
C. The Form of Gifts
As discussed above, contributions of appreciated assets re-
ceive a two-part incentive under the income tax. Not only is there
a reduction in taxable income due to the section 170 deduction,
but the tax on the unrealized capital gains of the asset is usually
forgiven as well." 5 Not surprisingly, this feature of the tax law
encourages donors to make gifts in the form of appreciated prop-
erty. Table 2 shows the importance of gifts of non-cash assets (of
which appreciated property is the major component at middle and
upper incomes) by income class in 1985.116 Clearly, gifts in non-
cash form are a significant part of total giving, especially in the
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
116.
Table 2
Percentage of Itemized Contributions
in Non-Cash Assets, 1985
Percentage of Contributions
Adjusted Gross Income Not in Cash or Carryover
Under $5,000 9.6
$5,000 under $10,000 7.1
$10,000 under $15,000 9.7
$15,000 under $20,000 7.6
$20,000 under $25,000 8.5
$25,000 under $30,000 8.4
$30,000 under $35,000 8.9
$35,000 under $40,000 8.3
$40,000 under $45,000 10.0
$45,000 under $50,000 9.4
$50,000 under $55,000 11.1
$55,000 under $60,000 13.9
$60,000 under $75,000 13.8
$75,000 under $100,000 14.8
$100,000 under $200,000 17.2
$200,000 under $500,000 13.5
$500,000 under $1,000,000 36.7
$1,000,000 or more 42.6
Source: INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1985 INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX RETURNS 62-63 (1988).
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upper income levels. This increase in non-cash giving as income
rises may be explained by patterns of asset holdings and the con-
venience of making gifts in asset form (such as properties that are
not actively traded). Yet, it seems likely that much of the ob-
served pattern is due to the more generous subsidy for gifts of
appreciated property given to taxpayers at high income levels.
To indicate the extent of this subsidy, Table 3 presents calcu-
lations of the net cost of making contributions of cash and appre-
ciated property in selected years for hypothetical couples at two
constant income levels.117 For example, consider a couple with an
117.
Table 3
Variation in Net Cost per Dollar of Charitable
Donation for Selected Years
Couples with Incomes of $250,000 in 1985 Dollars:
Gross income in Marginal
Year current dollars tax rate(a ) Net Cost of Giving One Dollar(b)
Asset with
a gain-to-
value ratio
of 0.5 that
would have
been sold if
Cash not donated
1955 $ 61,151 59 .41 .285
1970 94,424 56.4 .436 .308
1980 192,670 64 .36 .260
1985 250,000 50 .50 .40
1988 267,536 28 .72 .58
Couples with Incomes of $1,000,000 in 1985 Dollars:
1955 $ 244,604 87 .13 .005
1970 377,698 71.8 .282 .154
1980 770,683 70 .30 .20
1985 1,000,000 50 .50 .40
1988 1,070,144 28 .72 .58
Note: GNP price deflator used to convert incomes into current dollars. With 1985 =
111.2, the 1988 index was assumed to be 119.
(a)For each gross income, taxable income was estimated by multiplying the ratio of taxable
income to adjusted gross income (AGI) for the corresponding AGI class in that year by the
gross income figure. Using that taxable income, marginal tax rates were taken from the tax
table for joint returns. The rates for 1970 reflect a 2.5 percent surtax for that year.
(b)See Table I supra note 56. The price of giving stock assumes: P = 1 - m - .5mg, where
mg is the marginal tax rate on capital gains. For 1955 and 1970, mg = .5m, with a
maximum of .25; for 1980 and 1985, mg = .4m, with a maximum of .20; for 1988 mg =
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income of $250,000 in constant 1985 dollars in each of five differ-
ent years between 1955 and 1988. The table shows, first, the de-
gree to which marginal tax rates have varied over this period and
how this variation is reflected in the net cost of contributions. The
net cost of giving cash for a couple at this income level varied by a
factor of two: from 0.36 in 1980 to 0.72 in 1988. The net cost of
giving away an asset with a 50 percent gain-to-value ratio varied
even more: from 0.26 in 1980 to 0.58 in 1988. For a couple with
an income of $1 million in 1985 dollars, the differences are even
greater. In the case of gifts of appreciated property, the net cost
varied from 0.005 in 1955 to 0.55 in 1988. These figures serve as
further evidence of the dramatic variability of the tax code's sub-
sidy for charitable giving. They also show how inexpensive it can
be to make gifts of appreciated property.
One clear effect of this pattern of tax subsidies, notwithstand-
ing its tremendous variability, is to encourage gifts of appreciated
assets as opposed to cash.11 Gifts of appreciated assets, however,
often place effective limits on their disposition by donee organiza-
tions. Some appreciated assets, such as real estate or closely-held
corporations, are not readily marketable, leaving the donee organi-
zation to choose between holding it or disposing of it at a price
significantly below its long-term value. Furthermore, where the
donor retains part ownership or an active role in the management
of such assets, there exists a continuing relationship between do-
nor and'donee beyond that which might otherwise exist for a gift
of cash. Other assets, such as works of art or depreciable assets,
are eligible for the maximum tax deduction only if the donee or-
ganization can use the asset." 9 Thus, a donor can take full advan-
tage of the tax provisions for giving a painting to a nonprofit or-
ganization only if the organization holds onto it rather than selling
it immediately. This rule creates an obvious advantage for univer-
sities that maintain art museums - they are able to use works of
m. Couple is assumed not to be subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax.
118. Auten & Rudney, Comment on Donations of Appreciated Property, 34 TAx
NOTES 71, 71 (Jan. 5, 1987). See also Lindsey, Gifts of Appreciated Property: More to
Consider, 34 TAX NOTES 67, 69 (Jan. 5, 1987)(the 13,400 donors who made gifts of appre-
ciated property over $50,000 in value represented 0.2 percent of all donors of appreciated
property, but their gifts represented 38 percent of all appreciated gifts).
119. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i) (1986)(in the case of donation of "unrelated property"
the maximum deduction is reduced by the amount the donor would have recognized as long
term capital gain had he instead sold the property); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(3)
(as amended in 1988).
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art. The special advantage accorded to noncash giving may thus
have real effects on the range of activities carried out by nonprofit
organizations.
An analogous effect may be seen in the deduction under the
corporate income tax for articles of inventory.120 Manufacturers
who hold obsolete or otherwise unmarketable products may re-
cover some of their costs if they are able to donate these products
to a 501(c)(3) organization.121 This tax advantage has spawned a
market in obsolete products which are catalogued and warehoused
for possible use as in-kind donations. While such markets serve to
link donors and donees who would otherwise not find each other,
the generosity of the tax deduction may result in nonprofits' ac-
cepting products that are of marginal value to them.
Probably the most important tax rules affecting the form of
contributions, however, are those relating to the establishment and
operation of private foundations.122 Although the 1969 Tax Act
limited the advantages of setting up private foundations,123 the
American tax law has for many years offered wealthy individuals
a unique opportunity to "do good" while maintaining some mea-
sure of control, both during life and after death. This organiza-
tional form was made more attractive by the favorable treatment
of gifts of appreciated assets (constituting the basis for the great
bulk of foundations) and the degree of control 124 afforded by the
foundation form. Foundations have indeed made a discernible im-
pact and the tax law is a major contributor to their importance.
D. Regional Effects
Charitable giving varies with geographic region, and this cre-
ates regional patterns of activity in the nonprofit sector. Since
most contributions are directed to institutions geographically close
to the donor, there are regional patterns of growth in the volun-
tary sector which track the movement of population and income.
A dramatic illustration of these trends is presented in Table 4,
which gives the regional distribution of foundations, by net assets,
120. I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)(A) (1986)(no deduction unless the donee uses the donated
articles of inventory in a manner related to its charitable purpose).
121. Id.
122. I.R.C. §§ 4940-48 (1986).
123. C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 261-64.
124. C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 264.
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from 1934 to 1983.125 As regions outside the traditional North-
eastern financial centers grew in importance, so too did their
shares of foundation assets. Over the five-decade period reflected
in Table 4 the proportion of foundation net assets in New York
declined from 74 to 27 percent, while the combined proportion for
125.
Table 4
Distribution of Foundation Net Assets by Region, Selected Years (Percent)
Region 1934 1944 1955 1960 1975 1983
New York 74.3 52.4 55.8 63.8 36.8 27.1
Other Middle
Atlantic 5.1 9.5 8.9 6.1 14.0 12.4
East North
Central 10.9 20.4 14.1 12.2 19.3 18.7
Pacific 0.3 0.9 2.6 2.0 5.4 12.2
West South
Central 0. 2.1 2.9 3.0 6.2 9.9
South Atlantic 7.2 6.0 7.2 4.8 7.6 7.8
West North
Central 0.6 3.6 3.2 3.6 4.5 5.4
New England 1.3 3.1 3.4 2.8 4.0 3.9
Mountain 0.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
East South
Central 0 0.8 0.8 0.5 1.0 1.2
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Regions are defined as Other Middle Atlantic: New Jersey and Pennsylvania; East
North Central: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin; Pacific: Washington, Or-
egon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii; West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Texas; South Atlantic: Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida; West North
Central: Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas;
New England: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Con-
necticut; Mountain: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah,
and Nevada; East South Central: Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi.
Sources: 1983: THE FOUNDATION LIBRARY CENTER, THE FOUNDATION DIRECTORY (9th
ed. 1983); 1975: THE FOUNDATION LIBRARY CENTER, THE FOUNDATION DIRECTORY (5th
ed. 1975); 1960: THE FOUNDATION LIBRARY CENTER, THE FOUNDATION DIRECTORY iX-Xiv
(1st ed. 1960); 1955: AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS INFORMATION SERVICE. AMERICAN FOUN-
DATIONS AND THEIR FIELDS xi-xxi (1955); 1944: S. HARRISON & F. ANDREWS, AMERICAN
FOUNDATIONS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE 200-01, 214 (1946); 1934: TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND, INC., FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR FIELDS 9, 12-13 (1935).
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the Pacific and West South Central states, dominated by Califor-
nia and Texas, grew from less than 1 percent to 22 percent.
The focus now shifts to the role of tax policy on these
changes. Undoubtedly, these regional effects would still be present
in the absence of taxation. Yet, it appears that tax policy played a
role as well and that its impact was unintended. Government sub-
sidizes charitable contributions for itemizing taxpayers only. This
allows the deduction for state and local taxes126 to impart an un-
mistakable regional spin. States with particularly high taxes tend
to have more itemizers than other states.1 27 This results in higher
federal tax subsidies for contributors who reside in these higher
tax states. Although this bias has little effect on the formation of
foundations, since almost anyone setting up a foundation is likely
to be an itemizer in the top federal bracket, it might well have a
small impact on the overall pattern of contributions. For example,
the average (income-weighted) subsidy rate for taxpayers in
Michigan in 1983 was 0.21, compared to 0.12 in Maine. 28 Of this
9 percentage point difference, 2 points were attributed to the exis-
tence of the state and local tax deduction, which caused Michigan
to have more itemizing taxpayers than would otherwise be justi-
fied on the basis of other deductible expenditures. 29 Uncon-
sciously, Congress through the individual income tax, gives an
edge to nonprofits from high-tax states.
E. Allocation of Capital
The tax laws also affect the allocation between economic sec-
tors and within the nonprofit sector itself. Certainly one issue in-
volved in the current debate over "unrelated business income" is
the competitiveness of for-profit firms which sell products also pro-
duced by nonprofit organizations.' 3 Leaving to one side issues of
fairness, the current tax treatment of allowing nonprofits to sell
tax-free as long as it is within the general scope of its tax exempt
function appears to result in nonprofits obtaining larger shares in
certain markets than they would if they paid taxes on these activi-
126. I.R.C. § 164(a)(l)-(3) (1986).
127. C. CLOTFELTER & D. FEENBERG, Is THERE A REGIONAL BIAS IN FEDERAL TAX
SUBSIDY RATES FOR GIVING? 15 (1988)(National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 2564).
128. Id. at 21 (table 1).
129. Id. at 22 (table 3).
130. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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ties. 1' This is probably negligible in most markets, but it could
well have a discernible impact on others - for instance, textbooks
and personal computers. If nonprofit managers are more prone to
managerial inefficiencies ("x-inefficiency"), 132 then the overall effi-
ciency of some markets may be impaired due to the current tax
treatment.
Distortions in the allocation of capital within sectors may also
be observed. Accelerated depreciation and other capital subsidies
work in the for-profit sector to increase the capital-labor ratio.
Nonprofit firms are not subject to the corporation income tax,8 3
however, and such an effect is not present. The overall effect of
this aspect of tax policy, then, is to make the for-profit sector rela-
tively more capital-intensive than the nonprofit sector. There is lit-
tle empirical work, however, which indicates the magnitude of
these effects. These questions, for now, must await future study.
F. Segregation
As discussed above, one important class of nonprofit institu-
tions, the mutual benefit organizations, include private clubs. 3
Mutual benefit organizations rarely receive the benefit of the
charitable deduction, but they are generally tax-exempt." 5 In the
case of private clubs, this tax exemption may be questioned on the
basis that the organizations' aims or behavior are inconsistent
with more broadly-defined public policy. Rather than being a dis-
tortion between alternative activities, tax exemption in this case
would be questioned as being an unjustified subsidy, the purpose
of subsidies being to encourage activities with beneficial externali-
ties. By their nature, some if not most private clubs tend to in-
crease economic and racial segregation in society by bringing to-
gether similar individuals. When our tax laws treat these
131. For a discussion of the economic effects of tax treatment of nonprofit organiza-
tions, see Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corpo-
rate Income Taxation, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN
STRUCTURE AND POLICY 367, 378 (S. Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986); Rose-Ackerman, Unfair
Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITU-
TIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY 394, 394-96 (S. Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986).
132. Hansmann, supra note 131, at 380. For the definitive treatment of x-efficiency,
see Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency Versus X-Efficiency, 56 AM. EcON. REv. 392 (1966).
133. I.R.C. § 501 (1986).
134. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
135. I.R.C. § 501(a) & (c)(7) (1986) (private clubs "organized for pleasure, recrea-
tion, and other nonprofitable purposes" are tax exempt).
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organizations favorably, the cost of the resulting segregation is re-
duced and its extent presumably expanded. The same type of
analysis applies for communities where clubs are taxed at reduced
rates. Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to suggest
that differences in tax treatment affect the extent of racial or eco-
nomic segregation in a community. These questions invite further
research.
CONCLUSION
It is useful to conclude by considering the implications of the
various tax-induced distortions in the voluntary sector. Despite the
existence of these distortions, there is little justification for dis-
mantling the major tax provisions which sustain the nonprofit sec-
tor - tax exemption and the charitable deduction - because
these provisions are supported by the most fundamental models of
welfare economics. Where activities produce external benefits that
reach beyond the actors who engage in the activity, there is justifi-
cation for a subsidy. The justification is based on efficiency, aris-
ing out of a concern that society might not otherwise devote suffi-
cient time and money to such activities.13 6 The tax system
nevertheless creates distortions between alternative activities
within the voluntary sector and these distortions bear little rela-
tionship to the degree that the activities benefit society.
Probably the most important distortion is between those who
itemize their income taxes and those who do not. Virtually any
change in the income tax that affects the number of people who
itemize will have an impact on the severity of this distortion. In
addition, proposals specifically aimed at limiting the revenue im-
pact of itemized deductions in general or the charitable deduction
in particular would have an effect.1 17 In recent years, proposals
have been made to place floors under deductions, separately or in
total. Floors of either type would tend to reduce the number of
taxpayers who receive a subsidy for their contributions. On the
other hand, proposals to enhance the current charitable deduction,
by doubling the value of the deduction, re-extending the deduction
to nonitemizers, or offering an alternative tax credit - however
136. See supra notes 19 & 45 and accompanying text.
137. C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 25 ("Besides the general tax-exempt status of
nonprofit organizations itself, the income tax deduction is probably the most important
single tax policy affecting the vitality of the nonprofit sector in the United States.); see also
id. at 276-79.
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unlikely politically - would tend to reduce the current distortion
among taxpayers. Perhaps the most direct method of alleviating
this distortion is to replace the deduction with a tax credit availa-
ble to all taxpayers. 131 Apparently, one problem with any subsidy
for charitable contributions, and especially one for current
nonitemizers, is compliance. There appears to be a deep suspicion
in the halls of the Internal Revenue Service that many taxpayers
succumb to the temptation to overstate their contributions. A floor
is seen as an easy way to limit enforcement costs as well as the
revenue losses from any extention of the subsidy.
Another active area of debate concerns the current contro-
versy over "unfair competition" and the taxation of commercial
income of nonprofits 39 This Article analyses this question in
terms of resource allocation, not fairness. From this perspective,
tax treatment may well have allocative effects, but the extent of
these effects is another question. At one extreme in the current
debate are proposals to tax the investment income of nonprofits. 1 "0
As it demonstrated with the introduction of new taxes and restric-
tions on foundations in 1969,141 Congress can certainly increase
the overall tax burden on the nonprofit sector through a combina-
tion of taxes and new requirements. One implication of this cur-
rent .analysis is that the impact of these proposals on the allocation
of resources in the voluntary sector deserves far closer scrutiny.
138. Id. at 101-04 & 277.
139. See supra notes 7, 44 & 71 and accompanying text.
140. Bennett & Rudney, supra note 7, at 1095-96.
141. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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